P. Feyerabend's Methodology as a key to understanding modern economic theory

Abstract

The  objective of this report to answer the question – can  Feyerabend's methodology provide a key to understanding  modern economic theory.

Feyerabend argues that the violation of scientific canons is a condition for the development of scientific knowledge. This principle holds true in the field of economic knowledge, particularly during qualitative transformations known as scientific revolutions (Marxist, marginalist, Keynesian revolutions).

Feyerabend posits that a theory can never be refuted solely based on empirical evidence.

New theories are needed that will give these facts theoretical significance. Scientists should adhere to the methodological principle of “proliferation”  of theories in their scientific endeavors. The propensity for theory multiplication holds positive significance, as it fosters competition among theories, thereby enhancing their theoretical and methodological foundations.

Feyerabend’s skepticism, relativism, and voluntarism are opposed to dogmatism, the struggle against which is an essential condition for the development of any knowledge. Feyerabend’s approach facilitates a more comprehensive explanation of the heterogeneity of modern economic theory, which deviates from the paradigmatic structure of a research program and provides each author with the autonomy to develop their own conceptual framework.  Feyerabend's criticism of the cumulative model of scientific development leads us to believe that the concept of progress is not applicable to modern economic theory, only horizontal progress is acceptable, and therefore it becomes challenging to make definitive predictions about the future trajectory of economic science.